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I . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Proceedings. This is an appeal from 
a summary judgment denying recission of a real estate contract 
by the Buyers and Appellants herein, Clark Jenkins, Richard 
McCarver, Thomas C. Mabey and J. McRay Johnson (hereinafter 
"Jenkins group11) and granting the sellers and Respondents 
herein, A. Labrum § Sons, Inc., Arvin Bellon, Maurine G. 
Bellon, B. Curtis Dastrup and Lanis G. Dastrup (hereinafter 
"Labrum group") specific performance of the contract. 
B. Statement of Facts. On December 31, 1980, the 
Jenkins group entered into a Real Estate Contract to purchase 
an 80 acre parcel of real property located in Duchesne County 
from the Labrum group. Simultaneously, the Jenkins group 
purchased an adjoining 80 acre parcel from Marvel Malnar. In 
September of 1982, Deseret Gereration § Transmission 
Cooperative, a Utah corporation (hereinafter MDeseret!f) filed 
an action condemning a 172.4 foot strip through the middle of 
both 80 acre parcels of property to construct a high tension, 
electrical transmission towers and line. Complaint, Record 
(hereinafter "R."), pp. 1-5. On December 10, 1982, the Jenkins 
group answered Deseret1s Complaint and crossclaimed against the 
Labrum group for recission of the December 1980 real estate 
contract on the first 80 acre parcel. Answer and Crossclaim, 
R., pp. 167-177. The crosslclaim alledged "frustration of 
purpose11 as a basis for recission. On January 21, 1983, the 
Labrum group filed a counter crossclaim against the Jenkins 
group seeking specific performance of the real estate contract 
between the parties according to its original terms. Answer to 
Crossclaim and Counterclaim, R. pp. 188-206. 
As a condition precedent to the issuance of an Order 
for Immediate Occupancy on both 80 acre parcels, Deseret 
deposited $39,075 with the Court. Pursuant to the Stipulation 
(R., pp. 275-278) dated March 11, 1983, between the Jenkins 
group and Labrum group and waivers of the other parties, the 
deposit was released and applied to the parties in interest as 
follows: 
A. $30,000.00 on the Labrum group contract; 
B. $9,075.00 to the Jenkins group for the Malnar 
contract. 
On November 1, 1984, eighteen months after disbursal 
of the condemnation deposit, the Labrum group moved for 
summary judgment on both the crossclaim and counter crossclaim 
with a supporting memorandum, a copy of which is included in 
the Addendum as Exhibit "A". The facts asserted in the motion 
and memorandum were uncontested. 
On February 8, 1985, a few days prior to oral argument 
on the Motion for Summary Judgment, the Jenkins group filed an 
affidavit alleging an oral accord and satisfaction had occurred 
some two years prior. No motion nor pleadings were ever filed 
or amended to reflect the new defense. 
Oral argument was held on February 19, 1985, and on 
March 19, 1985, Judge Davidson issued a ruling reduced to 
judgment on May 22, 1985, finding: (1) "no cause of action" on 
the Jenkins group crossclaim for recission based on frustration 
of purpose and (2) granted the Labrum group specific 
performance of the contract on their crossclaim. See Addendum, 
Exhibit ,fBM. 
II. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Respondents maintain that the trial court's judgment 
should be affirmed on three theories: 
FIRST. Although denying any negotiated settlement or 
"accord and satisfaction11 was reached, enforcement of an oral 
settlement or accord and satisfaction as alleged in the 
affidavit of Appellants1 prior counsel is barred by Rule 2.9 
(c) of the Rules of Practice in the District Courts and the 
Statute of Frauds. If the alleged agreement is construed as a 
settlement, Rule 2.9 (c) requires stipulated settlements to be 
in writing. If the alleged agreement is construed as an 
"accord and satisfaction" the Statute of Frauds mandates the 
agreement be in writing. No facts are alleged in the affidavit 
which would remove the alleged agreement from the operation of 
the Statute. 
SECOND. The new agreement claimed to have been 
reached by Appellants, the Jenkins group, lacked new and 
sufficient consideration and is therefore unenforceable. The 
affidavit setting forth the alleged terms of the new agreement, 
at best, must rely on disbursal of the condemnation deposit as 
new consideration. Such deposits, however, are for the benefit 
of all parties in interest, including lienholders. In this 
instance, the deposit was disbursed to the Labrum group, 
lienholders on the property and applied on the existing 
obligation of the Jenkins group. Such acts are insufficient to 
constitute consideration for a new agreement. 
THIRD. Appellants failed to timely or properly raise 
the affirmative defense of "accord and satisfaction.11 Pursuant 
to Rule 8(c) and 12(h) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 




ENFORCEMENT OF AN ALLEGED ORAL, SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
INVOLVING MATTERS WITHIN THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS IS BARRED, AS A 
MATTER OF LAW, BY RULE 2.9(c) OF THE RULES OF PRACTICE OF THE 
DISTRICT COURTS AND THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 
The Jenkins group relies solely on the affidavit of 
prior counsel, George Diumenti, as a basis for error in the 
trial courts granting specific performance of the parties real 
estate contract. The affidavit alleges that during the 
pendency of the action (March 1983), the parties fully resolved 
all issues raised between them. (R., pp. 449-451). Rule 
2.9(c) of the Rules of Practice of the District Courts provides: 
Stipulated settlements and 
dismissals shall be reduced to 
writing and presented to the Court 
for signature within fifteen (15) 
days of the settlement and 
dismissal. 
The purpose of this rule is, obviously, to lend certainty and 
finality to the settlement of pending actions. 
If the alleged oral agreement as set forth in the 
Diumenti affidavit is construed as a settlement agreement, it 
clearly violates the spirit and content of the foregoing Rule 
of practice. The issue of a supposed settlement was not only 
oral but was not raised for almost two (2) years after the fact. 
Whether the alleged "accord and satisfaction11 is 
construed as a modification of the original agreement or a new 
agreement, it necessarily involves an interest in real property 
and must survive the Statute of Frauds, Utah Code Annotated 
§25-5-1. The affidavit acknowledges, at best, an oral 
agreement and an attempt to utilize the disbursal of the 
Plaintiff's deposit for obtaining an Order of Immediate 
Occupancy as partial performance to defeat the Statute. No 
other claim of performance is contained in the record. 
This Court has consistantly maintained that acts 
sufficient to constitute part performance and remove an oral 
agreement from the Statute of Frauds, must be exclusively 
referable to the oral contract. Woolsey v. Brown, Utah, 439 
P.2d 1035 (1975); In re Roth's Estate, 2 Utah 2d 40, 269 P.2d 
278 (1954). In the Roth!s Estate case the Court further stated 
that the part performance must be reasonably explicable only on 
the postulate that a contract exists. 
In this instance, disbursal of a deposit of a 
condemning authority prior to trial among the owners and 
lienholders, without changing their contractual relationship, 
is the rule rather than exeption. As provided in Utah Code 
Annotated, §78-34-9 relating to such deposits, upon the 
application of parties in interest, the Court shall order the 
deposit to be paid forthwith and. . "shall make such orders in 
respect to encumbrances, liens, rents, assessments, insurance 
and other charges, if any, as shall be just and equitable." 
The Labrum group had a lien exceeding $200,000.00 on 
80 acres of the 160 acres of land affected by the 
condemnation. Exhibit A to Answer and Crossclaim, R., pp. 
167-177. The value of their security was greatly deminished by 
the taking of Deseret. Answer and Crossclaim, R., pp. 167-177, 
paragraph 11. Application of the deposit to the contract 
lienholder as per the Stipulation, R., pp. 275-278 was the 
normal and logical action, in and of itself, and not only 
explicable on the postulate that a new oral "accord and 
satisfaction" existed. 
POINT II 
THE JENKINS GROUP'S PURPORTED ORAL ACCORD AND 
SATISFACTION MUST FAIL FOR LACK OF CONSIDERATION. 
The affidavit relied on by the Jenkins group when 
viewed in a light most favorable to them fails as a matter of 
law to establish the necessary elements of a contract of accord 
and satisfaction. Such contracts require all the essential 
elements of contracts generally, including, new and sufficient 
consideration. Sugar House Finance Co. v. Anderson, Utah, 610 
P.2d 1369 (1980). To do what one is already bound to do is 
insufficient. The consideration recited in the affidavit 
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relied on by the Jenkins group was a stipulation to disburse a 
portion of the condemnation deposit to the Labrum group. Since 
all parties in interest had potential claims to the deposit and 
the deposit was applied by stipulation on existing, undisputed 
obligations of the Jenkins group, it is insufficient to support 
a new agreement. 
POINT III 
THE JENKINS GROUP FAILED TO TIMELY AND PROPERLY RAISE 
THE DEFENSE OF ACCORD AND SATISFACTION. 
Rule 8(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
requires that the affirmative defense of accord and 
satisfaction be set forth specifically in the pleadings and 
Rule 12(h) provides that a party wavies all defenses which are 
not so pleaded. Phillips v. JCM Development Corporation, Utah, 
666 P.2d 876 (1983); Hintze v. Seaich, Utah, 437 P.2d 202 
(1968). 
The only effort to raise the defense of accord and 
satisfaction by the Jenkins Group was in the form of an 
affidavit in opposition to the Labrum Group's Motion for 
Summary Judgment filed shortly before oral argument. As noted 
by this Court in Sugar House Finance Company case at Page 1371, 
a party may raise the defense of accord and satisfaction by 
properly pleading the same as a defense, or in the alternative, 
-8-
may seek to enforce an accord and satisfaction by appropriate 
motion or independent action seeking affirmative relief from 
the judgment under Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. The Jenkins Group has not availed itself of any of 
the foregoing procedures. The supposed "accord and 
satisfaction11 was purportedly entered into almost two years 
prior to the filing of the affidavit opposing summary 
judgment. During this period of time, the Jenkins Group failed 
to even attempt to amend their pleadings despite the 
continuation of the litigation. The Labrum Group finally filed 
a Motion for Summary Judgment on November 1, 1984, asking the 
Court to decide the only issue raised by the pleadings. Is 
flfustration of purpose11 a basis for recission of the contract? 
Some three and one-half months later and only a few days prior 
to oral argument, the Jenkins Group filed their affidavit 
alleging the accord and satisfaction. 
Although liberality in pleading is the rule of the 
day, some line must be drawn to give any meaning to Rules 8(c) 
and 12(h). Failure to even attempt to plead a defense known to 
the Jenkins Group for almost two years surpasses the limits of 
liberality in pleading. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
The summary judgment on the Jenkins Groupfs crossclaim 
-9-
requesting recission on the grounds of "frustration of purpose" 
should be affirmed together with the summary judgment granting 
specific performance on the Labrum Group's counter crossclaim. 
Respectfully submitted this 11th day of November, 1985. 
LABRUM $ TAYLOR 
MICHAEL R. LABRUM 
LABRUM § TAYLOR 
108 NORTH MAIN STREET 
RICHFIELD, UTAH 84701 
Telephone: 896-6484 
Attorney for Respondents 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I herewith and hereby certify that four copies of 
the foregoing Brief of Respondents were placed in the United 
States mail at Richfield, Utah, with first-class postage 
thereon fully prepaid, this 11th day of November, 1985, 
addressed to John P. Ashton and Natasha Matkin, PRINCE, YEATES 
§ GELDZAHLER, Attorneys at Law, 424 East Fifth South, Third 
Floor MONY Plaza, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
MICHAEL R. LABRUM 
LABRUM & TAYLOR 
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS 
Bellons, A. Labrum and Sons, 
Inc., and Dastrups 
108 NORTH MAIN 
RICHFIELD, UTAH 84701 
896-6484 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DESERET GENERATION & * 
TRANSMISSION COOPERATIVE MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
a Utah corporation, * DEFENDANTS A. LABRUM AND SONS, INC., 
ARVIN L. BELLON, MAURINE G. BELLON, 
Plaintiff, * B. CURTIS DASTRUP AND LANIS D. 
DASTRUP'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
vs. * JUDGMENT 
FERRON ELDER, et al., * Civil No. 7732 
Defendants. * 
COME NOW Defendants ARVIN L. BELlON,TAURINE G. 
BELLON, A. LABRUM AND SONS, B. CURTIS DASTRUP and LANIS D. DASTRUP 
and submit the following memorandum of points and authorities in 
support of their motion for summary judgment against Defendants 
Clark Jenkins, Richard McCarver, Thomas C. Mabey and J. McRay 
Johnson on said parties' crossclaim and movants counter crossclaim. 
FACTS 
On or about December 31, 1980, Defendants Clark Jenkins, 
Richard McCarver, Thomas C. Mabey and J. McRay Johnson (hereinafter 
"Purchasers") entered into a written contract for the purchase of 
certain real property and water rights from Defendants Arvin L. Bellon, 
-2-
Maurine G. Bellon, A. Labrum and Sons, Inc., B. Curtis Dastrup 
and Lanis D. Dastrup (hereinafter "Sellers"), a copy of said contract 
being attached hereto and incorporated herein by this reference. 
The effect of a condemnation was not provided for in the terms of 
the contract. Purchasers paid a down payment of $70,000.00 and 
pursuant to Paragraph 6 of said agreement, took possession as of 
the date of the contract. Purchasers werp d^^d^d t^n (10) anrpq 
pursuant to the partial release provision or said contract. Purchaser 
failed to make the October 15, %1981, payment in the amount of 
$33,302.05 and by subsequent agreement on the 21st day of October, 
19 81, were granted an extension to December 1, 1981, on said 
payment. Purchasers failed to satisfy the 19 81 payment on the 
extension date or any subsequent payments. Purchasers failed to 
satisfy property taxes on the property for the year 19 81 and 
subsequent periods as required by the contract. 
On or about September 19, 19 82, Plaintiff, Deseret 
Generation & Transmission Cooperative, initiated a condemnation 
action condemning portions of the property which were the subject 
matter of Purchasers and Sellers agreement for the purpose of install-
ing a power line. On or about December 21, 1982, Sellers served 
notice of default on Purchasers. Purchasers have neither paid nor 
tendered the delinquencies on the contract. 
Purchasers named as Defendants in the condemnation filed 
a crossclaim against Sellers requesting termination of the contract 
-3-
and refund of monies paid on the grounds of frustration of purpose, 
impossiblity of performance or destruction of the purpose and object 
of the contract. Sellers answered said crossclaim denying the same 
and counterclaimed for specific performance of the contract, 
POINT I. 
CONDEMNATION OF REAL PROPERTY IS A REASONABLY FORSEEABLE 
EVENT AND CANNOT, THEREFORE, TRIGGER APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE 
OF FRUSTRATION OF PURPOSE IN ORDER TO AVOID PERFORMING UNDER AN 
EXECUTORY CONTRACT. 
The crossclaim of Purchasers when reduced to its 
essential elements claims that Purchasers bought property from 
Sellers for the purpose of developing a residential subdivision; 
that twenty (20) months thereafter, a public utility condemned a 
portion of the property subject to the contract and that Purchasers1 
purpose and the purpose of the contract, i.e. subdivision is , 
therefore, frustrated or interfered with and Purchasers should be 
permitted to rescind the contract on the principle of ^ frustration 
of purpose. The doctrine of frustration of purpose was examined by 
the Utah Supreme Court in Castagno vs. Church, Ut., 552 P2nd 1282 (19 
wherein the Court observed: 
"The applicability of this doctrine depends on the 
total or nearly total destruction of the purpose for 
which, in the contemplation of both parties, the 
transaction was made. Although performance remains 
possible, the expected value of performance to the 
parties seeking to be excused has been destroyed, 
by a fortuitous event which supervenes to cause an 
-4-
actual, but not literal failure of consideration. 
Where the defense of frustration is proper, the 
issue is whether the equities, considered in the 
light of sound public policy requiring placing 
the risk of destruction or disruption of the 
contract equilibrium on the Defendant or the 
Plaintiff." 
The Court goes on to state that if the event was not 
reasonably foreseeable, then it is the type of supervening 
fortuitous event which may be raised in terms of frustration 
of purpose. However, if the event was foreseeable, it should 
have been included in the contract and the absence of such 
provision gives rise to the inference that the risk was assumed. 
The burden is upon the moving party to show that the risk was 
not reasonably foreseeable. Frustration of purpose is no 
defense if the event is foreseeable. Castagno vs. Church, supra. 
In the instant case, the issue is reduced to whether 
the risk of the event that has supervened to cause the alleged 
frustration was reasonably foreseeable. It is common knowledge 
that many real estate contracts provide for allocation of the 
risk in the event of a condemnation by a sovreign entity. The 
instant contract made no such provision, and in the absence thereof, 
Utah cases have consistently held that the Purchasers have assumed 
such a risk and are entitled to the award, together with any 
increase or decrease in the value of the property, subject only 
to the Sellers1 continuing lien. Brigham City vs. Rich, 34 Utah 130 
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97 P 2nd 220 (1908); Jelco, Inc., vs. Third Judicial District 
Court, Utah, 511 P 2nd 739 (1973). See 27 ALR 3rd 572, 592-597. 
As stated in the Jelco case above: 
"Thus, in the absence of an agreement to the 
contrary, where a condemnor takes land subject 
to an executory contract, it is the vendee who 
is normally entitled to any condemnation award 
for the land so taken. It is he who is entitled 
to the benefit of any increase and who must bear 
the detriment of any decrease, in the value of 
the property; whereas, the vendor (Jeremy) has 
only legal title. . . .he (vendor) is, of course, 
also entitled to retain the legal title as 
security for its performance, and in case of 
default, to seek the remedies provided therein." 
In the present case, there is one additional factor 
which makes such a conclusion even more demanding. The Purchasers, 
pursuant to a partial release clause in the contract, have already 
received legal title to ten (10) acres of the property subject to 
the contract, as well as the condemnation. 
CONCLUSION. The Sellers are entitled to specific 
performance of the contract as written. The Court should find 
no cause of action on Purchasers1 crossclaim. 
POINT II. 
PURCHASERS, UNDER AN EXECUTORY CONTRACT, WHO HAVE TAKEN 
POSSESSION OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY AND RECEIVED LEGAL TITLE TO 
PORTIONS THEREOF ARE THE "OWNERS" OF THE PROPERTY AND MUST BEAR 
ALL INCREASES OR DECREASES IN VALUE THEREOF. 
The Jelco case, supra, involved a situation very similar 
to the instant case. Property, subject to an executory contract, 
was condemned. The Purchasers had received equitable title to all tt 
property and legal title to portions thereof. No provision in the 
contract provided for allocation of risk in the event of eminent 
domain proceedings. The Supreme Court in reviewing the situation 
noted unequivocally that a purchaser under an executory contract 
acquired all incidents of ownership, except legal title, and in 
equity is regarded as the owner of the property. Absent any provisi< 
in the contract to the contrary, a purchaser, as owner, is entitled 
to any increase in the value of said property, as well as must 
bear detriment of any decrease in the value of said property. This 
proposition was again upheld in Utah State Medical Association vs. 
Utah State Employees Credit Union, Utah, 655 P 2nd 643 (1982). The 
Court in that case stated that the purchaser bears risk of any loss 
depreciation to property, based on a principle of equitable ownershi 
absent the vendor's fault or negligence. The only way the parties 
may shift this burden is by provision in the contract to the 
contrary. Although not specifically adopted in the State of Utah, 
the Uniform Vendor and Purchaser Risk Act represents a condensation 
of general law in such matters and under Section 1, Subparagraph (b) 
states: 
"If, when either the legal title or the possession, 
of the subject matter of the contract has been 
transferred, all or any part thereof is destroyed 
without fault of the vendor or is taken by eminent 
domain, the purchaser is not, thereby, relieved from 
a duty to pay the price, nor is he entitled to recover 
any portion thereof that he has paid." 
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In the present case, the Purchasers were granted 
possession of the subject matter in 1980, legal title to 
ten (10) acres of the subject matter was subsequently conveyed 
pursuant to the partial release provision. Purchasers have 
assumed all incidents of ownership and there was clearly no 
fault or negligence on the part of the Sellers which precipitated 
the condemnation. 
CONCLUSION. The Purchasers under the executory contract 
are the owners of the property and entitled to any proceeds 
drived from the condemnation action, subject only to the 
lien of Sellers. Sellers are entitled to specific performance 
of the agreement as written and Purchasers1 crossclaim for 
recision should be dismissed for no cause of action. 
DATED: November 1, 19 84. 
LABRUM & TAYLOR 
EXHIBIT "B" 
ROBERT F. ORTON 
MARSDEN, ORTON & LILJENQUIST 
68 SOUTH MAIN, FIFTH FLOOR 
SALT LAKE CKTY, UTAH 84101 
TELEPHONE: (801) 521-3800 
MICHAEL R. LABRUM 
LABRUM & TAYLOR 
108 NORTH MAIN STREET 
RICHFIELD, UTAH 84701 
TELEPHONE: (801) 896-6484 
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS, AL LABRUM & SONS, INC., B. CURTIS 
DASTRUP, LANIS D. DASTRUP, ARVIN L. BELLON & MAURICE G. BELLON 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DESERET GENERATION & TRANS- * 
MISSION CO-OPERATIVE, a Utah 
Corporation, * 
Plaintiff, * SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO 
DEFENDANT'S CROSSCLAIM AND 
VS. * COUNTER CROSSCLAIM 
FERRON ELDER, et al., * * Civil No. 7732 
Defendants. * 
This matter having come before the above-entitled Court 
on the 19th day of February, 1985, at the Duchesne County Courthouse, 
Duchesne, Utah, on the Honorable Richard C. Davidson, District Judge 
presiding, pursuant to Defendant's Bellon, Labrum and Dastrups Motion 
for Summary Judgment on the Crossclaim of Defendants Jenkins, 
McCarver, Mabey ahd McRay and the Counter Crossclaim of movants herein; 
Defendants Jenkins, McCarver, Mabey and McRay appearing by counsel, 
David K. Broadbent and John P. Ashton, Esquires of Prince, Yeates 
& Geldzahler, and the Defendants Bellon, Labrum and Dastrup appearing 
by counsel Michael R. Labrum of Labrum and Taylor, and the Court 
having examined the files, pleadings and memorandum in support and 
opposition to said motion and having heard the arguments of counsel 
and being fully advised in the premises and having rendered a ruling 
in the matter9 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. Defendants Bellon, Labrum and Dastrup are entitled to 
and are hereby granted specific performance of the real estate 
contract with Defendants Jenkins, McCarver, Mabey and McRay. 
2. Defendants Bellon, Labrum and Dastrup are entitled to 
and are granted a judgment of "no cause of action" on Defendants 
Jenkins, McCarver, Mabey and McRayfs crossclaim. 
DATED this ^ ^ day of &jk^L, 19 85. 
BY THE COURT 
jsi 
RICHARD C. DAVIDSON, DISTRICT JUDGE 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Summary 
Judgment as to Defendant's Crossclaim and Counter Crossclaim was 
placed in the United States mail, postage prepaid, this /{ c *' 
day of April, 19 85, addressed to: 
David K. Broadbent, Esq. 
John P. Ashton, Esq, 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
24 East 5th South, #300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Mr. Robert F. Orton 
Attorney at Law 
68 South Main, Fifth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
r / 
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